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Why the Nineteenth Amendment Matters Today: A Guide for the 
Centennial 
NEIL S. SIEGEL* 
Today’s skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or 
opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history. As a plurality 
of this Court acknowledged a generation ago, “our Nation has had a long 
and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.” Through a century plus 
three decades and more of that history, women did not count among 
voters composing “We the People”; not until 1920 did women gain a 
constitutional right to the franchise.  
    –United States v. Virginia (1996)1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
“[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged 
by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”2 This year marks the one 
hundredth anniversary of the ratification of that radically pro-democratic 
amendment, which empowered roughly ten million women to vote in a general 
election for the first time.3 Given the practical and expressive significance of the 
“Susan B. Anthony Amendment,” so named to honor the woman who wrote it and 
served as one of its most prominent champions, it is altogether fitting that the 
American Bar Association, numerous law schools, and a variety of public-spirited 
organizations are honoring the occasion.4 But all Americans—citizens, legislators, 
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 1.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
684 (1973) (footnote omitted)). The omitted footnote is discussed infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 2.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 3.  AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 419 (2005) (calling the Nineteenth 
Amendment “the single biggest democratizing event in American history” and noting that “[e]ven the most 
extraordinary feats of the Founding and Reconstruction eras had involved the electoral empowerment and/or 
enfranchisement of hundreds of thousands, not millions”). 
 4.  See, e.g., 19th Amendment Centennial of Women’s Right to Vote, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/ 
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lawyers, judges, and constitutional law scholars—might do more than honor their 
shared past. They might be encouraged to think about why the story of the 
Nineteenth Amendment matters to Americans living today. That story includes 
more than a half-century of social movement contestation over whether permitting 
women to vote would destroy or democratize the American family and the 
American constitutional structure. That story also includes pitched debates over 
the framing, ratification, and subsequent interpretation of the Nineteenth 
Amendment.5 
This Essay revisits the story of the Nineteenth Amendment—an unfinished 
narrative of both disappointment and hope—in the service of identifying reasons 
why that story relates to the lives of contemporary Americans. The overarching 
objective of the Essay is to suggest that the full story of the Amendment—which 
is mostly absent from both public memory and the constitutional canon—has 
always involved much more than a narrow debate over a determinate decision 
rule regarding women’s access to the franchise. To accomplish that objective, the 
Essay makes four points in four parts. The first two explain when and how voting 
rights for all women slowly became a reality, and the final two identify some 
implications of that history for American constitutional law and contemporary 
constitutional politics. 
Part I considers which women were enfranchised when and why it matters.  
It first notices the significance of the fact that adult, female citizens of the United 
States today possess a federal constitutional right to vote that did not exist for most 
of American history. This Part  then emphasizes that women plural gained a 
constitutional right to vote not only because of enforcement of the Nineteenth 
Amendment, but also because of eventual enforcement of the Fifteenth 
Amendment—an addition to the Constitution that, to the nation’s shame, went 
unenforced throughout the American South for almost a century.6 It turns out that 
ratifying a constitutional amendment and enforcing it are not the same thing—
whether in the case of the Fifteenth Amendment or, as discussed in Parts III and 
IV, in the case of the Nineteenth Amendment, which remains a work in progress. 
Part II considers some of the social groups and constitutional structures that 
both impeded and facilitated woman suffrage. It first examines the role of men in 
undermining and advancing the equal citizenship stature of women. It then 
critiques the notion of virtual representation—the often-made argument that 
woman suffrage was unnecessary because their interests were already well-
 
groups/public_education/Programs/19th-amendment-centennial/(last visited Feb. 6, 2020). 
 5.  For a discussion among Professor Nancy Cott, Professor Reva Siegel, and the author of the 
history of the Nineteenth Amendment and its bearing on issues affecting women in contemporary American 
society, see Nat’l Const. Ctr., From Suffrage to Workplace Equality, YOUTUBE (May 5, 2014), https://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=—zRnN9denQ&app=desktop. 
 6.  Technically, the Nineteenth Amendment prohibits sex-based disenfranchisements; it does not 
confer a fundamental right to vote.  The difference between the two kinds of constitutional entitlements 
helped enable states—especially those of the former Confederacy—to pay lip service to the Fifteenth 
Amendment while preventing African Americans from voting through such facially race-neutral devices 
as poll taxes, literacy tests, and grandfather clauses.  But the Nineteenth Amendment effectively confers 
a fundamental right to vote upon women because states have not used such shams to disenfranchise 
them, and in any event, subterfuges would not survive modern constitutional law’s policing of racist 
or sexist intent.  See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. 515. 
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represented by the men in their lives—as an argument for limitations on the 
franchise. Finally, this Part examines the role of federalism reasoning and rhetoric 
in thwarting and promoting women’s equality—and equality values more 
generally—as evidenced by recent, dramatic changes in social values on the 
constitutional status of sexual orientation minorities. 
Part III explains the historical and conceptual link between restrictions on 
woman suffrage and the social subordination of women to men in the family and 
in American society. This Part shows how the history and anti-subordination 
rationale of the Nineteenth Amendment bears on both its own interpretation and 
the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause by the courts. Constitutional 
interpretation that reads the Nineteenth Amendment purposively, not literally, 
can be described as structural. Constitutional interpretation that reads the Equal 
Protection Clause in light of the Nineteenth Amendment can be described as 
synthetic. Both kinds of interpretation are relatively common in constitutional law. 
Part IV turns from contemporary constitutional law to the contemporary 
implications of the story of the Nineteenth Amendment for American 
constitutional politics. It first explores significant differences in the interpretive 
arguments of opponents of the Nineteenth Amendment before and after its 
ratification: they moved from decrying an affirmative answer to “the woman 
question” as radically transforming both the American family and American 
federalism to recasting the question as involving merely a decision rule about 
voting in elections. This Part cautions against permitting such a future recasting of 
current debates over the Equal Rights Amendment, should that proposed 
amendment be ratified in the years ahead. Part IV then underscores the slow, 
uneven pace of progress in disestablishing gender hierarchies. Finally, it suggests 
that the history and meaning of the Nineteenth Amendment, both standing on its 
own interpretive bottom and read synthetically with the Equal Protection Clause, 
should inspire contemporary Americans to ask whether current regulations of 
women reflect or reinforce their inferior social status within and outside the 
family. 
The Conclusion suggests an additional reason why the Nineteenth 
Amendment matters today. As Americans wrestle with their collective past and 
conflict rages over how to remember luminaries like Woodrow Wilson and social 
movements like woman suffrage, the story of the Nineteenth Amendment 
illustrates that history is often a mixed bag; that most groups and movements are 
neither morally pure nor pure evil; that people who pursue even the most noble 
of causes can still be deeply flawed and partially blind, especially in a fallen world 
that demands compromise as the price of progress; and that sometimes people can 
change, at least somewhat and with respect to certain moral questions, if not 
others. The Conclusion also counsels introspection and circumspection in 
approaching the centennial of the Nineteenth Amendment. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF WOMEN PLURAL TO VOTE 
A. The Right of Women to Vote 
In today’s United States, adult, female citizens possess a federal 
constitutional right to vote. Although that fact might seem so obvious as to go 
without saying, it is worth saying out loud because it was not true for most of 
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American history. At the Founding and throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, women were considered United States citizens but lacked a 
federal right to vote. Voting was not conceived of as a right that attached to 
American citizenship; rather, voting was considered a political privilege that was 
restricted to Americans who possessed enough independence to exercise the 
franchise responsibly.7 Initially, white men without property were thought to lack 
the independence required to be trustworthy in exercising the franchise,8 as were 
African Americans and, to this day, minors.9 Women, too, were thought to lack 
sufficient independence on the ground that their votes would be unduly 
influenced by the men on whom they depended for their subsistence—namely, 
their husbands.10 
Federal constitutional voting rights for women matter today in part for 
expressive reasons. For example, parents can point to the text of the Constitution 
in explaining to their daughters, as well as their sons, that they will possess 
political equality when they become adults. By contrast, the original Constitution 
contained no such guarantee. Indeed, the constitutional text referred to the 
President as male at least in part because it was simply unimaginable that the 
President could be female.11 
Moreover, the reconstructed Constitution emancipated African American 
slaves, made them citizens, and protected the men among them from racial 
discrimination in voting (at least on paper), but declined to extend the franchise to 
women. Sorely disappointed by the message women’s exclusion sent were 
suffragists led by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony. They had worked 
toward abolition before the Civil War; they had led petition drives in support of 
 
 7.  See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 174 (2000) (“[W]omen . . . were excluded from the polity for the same reason that the poor 
and propertyless were disenfranchised in the late eighteenth century: they purportedly lacked the 
‘independence’ necessary for participation in electoral politics.”). 
 8.  See, e.g., JILL LEPORE, THESE TRUTHS: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 113 (2018) (observing that 
“many men of means” during the 1770s and 1780s “believ[ed] that poor men, like women, lacked the capacity 
to make good political decisions because, dependent on others, their will was not their own,” and that 
“Massachusetts’s constitution included property qualifications both for office seekers and for voters”); id. 
(“As [John] Adams explained, ‘Such is the Frailty of the human Heart, that very few Men, who have no 
Property, have any Judgment of their own.’”) (quoting Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 
1776), in 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 210 (Robert J. Taylor, Gregg L. Lint, & Celeste Walker eds., 1980)). 
 9.  See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Foreword to SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS: 
MILESTONES IN EQUALITY xii (Clare Cushman ed., 2001) (quoting RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF 
THE UNION, 1781–1789, 193 (1987) (writing that “a prime portion of the history of the U.S. Constitution, 
and a cause for celebration, is the story of the extension (through amendment, judicial interpretation, 
and practice) of constitutional rights and protections to once ignored or excluded people: to humans 
who were once held in bondage, to men without property, to the original inhabitants of the land that 
became the United States, and to women”)). 
 10.  See generally Reva B. Siegel, Collective Memory and the Nineteenth Amendment: Reasoning About “the 
Woman Question” in the Discourse of Sex Discrimination, in HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE LAW 131–82, 144 
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999) [hereinafter Siegel, Collective Memory and the Nineteenth 
Amendment] (arguing, among other things, that in the view of the founding generation, “persons in 
relations of dependency were unfit to govern because they were governed by others”). 
 11.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years . . . .”).  
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ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment; and they had initially advocated 
universalism in voting rights in the hope that securing voting rights for African 
American men would also mean gaining voting rights for women. Those hopes 
were soon dashed. In 1865, suffragists were told by the prominent abolitionist 
Wendell Phillips that “[t]his hour belongs exclusively to the negro,”12 and “the 
negro’s hour” became a catch-phrase among abolitionists. During Reconstruction, 
the (male) leaders of the Republican Party did not see why women (as opposed to 
African Americans) needed the right to vote in order to protect themselves, nor 
did they see how enfranchising women (again, in contrast with African 
Americans) would give Republicans a partisan advantage.13 
Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment actually introduced facial sex 
classifications into the text of the Constitution for the first time in American 
constitutional history, making express what had previously been assumed: 
[W]hen the right to vote at any election . . . is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the 
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, 
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the 
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole 
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.14 
Those sex distinctions presupposed—and announced to the world—that being 
female was incompatible with being a voter. Expressive considerations matter 
because of the social meanings they convey to Americans about the character and 
destiny of America, as well as about their own status and the status of others in 
the national political community.15 
But more important than the symbolism of whose rights reside—or do not 
reside—in controlling constitutional text are the practical reasons why voting 
 
 12.  The Anniversaries: Important Session of the Anti-Slavery Society, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1865, at 1, https:// 
www.nytimes.com/1865/05/10/archives/the-anniversaries-important-session-of-the-antislavery-society.html 
(speech of Wendell Phillips).  
[T]hat we may check State Rights at the proper time and place, I want to have another 
amendment passed which shall read thus: no State shall at any time make a distinction of 
civil privileges between the children of parents living on or born on her soil, either of race, 
condition or color. [Applause.] I hope some day to be bold enough to add ‘sex.’ However, 
my friends, we must take up but one question at a time, and this hour belongs exclusively to 
the negro. 
Id. 
 13.  See KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 180, 183 (emphasizing those differences). 
 14.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphases added). Apportionment penalties should have been 
triggered when (mostly ex-Confederate) states prevented African American men from voting, but 
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment was never enforced. 
 15.  See generally Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Compelling Interests and Contraception, 47 U. CONN. L. 
REV. 1025 (2015) (clarifying, from within the horizon of both American society and the individual, what is 
expressively at stake in ensuring that people are free from race or sex discrimination); id. at 1032–33 (“In 
prohibiting race discrimination, the public also expresses the identity and values of the polity as a 
whole, defending and furthering its form of life as a community. Shared understandings of this kind 
are essential if a society is to realize its claims to provide equal citizenship and to practice democracy.”); 
id. at 1034 (“Also at stake for [individuals] is their standing in the community. Whether they possess 
or lack equal citizenship stature determines whether they live as outsiders looking in, or as insiders 
looking around.”). 
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rights for women are vitally important today. Whatever one thinks of the 
legislative conduct of American politicians toward women as a general matter, it 
is hard to see how women (or any other group of people for that matter) would be 
better off materially if those politicians did not require any of their votes in order 
to obtain re-election. 
Certain issues disproportionately affect women. Examples, which are 
discussed in the final Part of this Essay, include the problems of unequal pay for 
equal work and a lack of paid family- and self-care leave to help women (and men) 
negotiate their responsibilities at work and at home, where women continue to do 
more than their fair share of parenting and household maintenance. Another 
example is statutory impediments to accessing effective, affordable contraception, 
which is used by a solid majority of adult women in the United States. An 
additional example is abortion-restrictive regulations. Despite being controversial 
among women, such regulations include draconian limitations—such as bans as 
early as six weeks into pregnancy and no exceptions for rape or incest—that most 
women (and men) oppose.16 
Other issues do not disproportionately affect women in particular. For 
example, budgets reflect the values of those who create or seek to benefit from 
them. Demagogic politicians who stoke hatred and division diminish civic life for 
everyone, but especially the most vulnerable among us—regardless of gender.  
And men and women both are affected by the circumstances in which they or their 
children are sent to war. Whether or not an issue of particular concern to women 
is at stake, the interests and values of women collectively (when their interests and 
values converge) and individually (when they do not) are better protected by their 
possession of a federal constitutional entitlement to vote, which helps them to hold 
politicians accountable for the decisions they make that affect women’s lives and 
the lives of the people women care about. 
B. The Right of Women Plural to Vote 
As developed in the work of black women scholars such as Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, the concept of intersectionality directs attention to the fact that various 
forms of discrimination may overlap and so differentially affect members of 
multiple traditionally excluded groups.17 For example, African American women 
may be discriminated against for being both black and female, and so may be 
differently situated from both African American men and white women in a 
 
 16.  See, e.g., Daniel Bush, New Abortion Laws Are Too Extreme for Most Americans, Poll Shows, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (June 7, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/new-abortion-laws-are-too-
extreme-for-most-americans-poll-shows;  Ariel Edwards-Levy, Here’s Why Alabama’s New Abortion Law Is So 
Unpopular, HUFFINGTON POST (May 22, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/alabama-abortion-law-
poll_n_5cdee283e4b00e035b8f7452; Emily Guskin & Scott Clement, Abortion Support Is the Highest It’s Been in 
Decades as Challenges Mount, WASH. POST (July 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/ 
07/10/abortion-support-is-highest-its-been-two-decades-two-decade-high-challenges-roe-mount/. 
 17.  Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989). For 
an example of another black woman scholar who made similar claims at the same time about the 
intersectional impact of race and gender, see generally Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist 
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990). 
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variety of contexts, such as certain opportunities for employment. The idea of 
intersectionality has been extended beyond the intersection of race and gender to 
illuminate the particular struggles for equal citizenship of members of a variety of 
different groups. For instance, gay African American men may be differently 
situated in certain respects from both gay people generally and African Americans 
generally. 
An intersectional sensibility resists uncritical acceptance of the claim one 
often hears that women as a group gained a constitutional right to vote with the 
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. In point of fact, the right of 
women of color to vote, like the right of people of color more generally to vote, 
was not vindicated until after passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which 
finally committed the nation to enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition 
on racial discrimination in voting. That amendment had been ratified in 1870, but 
it was defied by Southern states that effectively disenfranchised African 
Americans for the better part of a century. It was not until the second half of the 
twentieth century that women plural were able to vote, as a result of federal 
enforcement of both the Nineteenth Amendment and the Fifteenth Amendment. 
Put differently, some Southern politicians, in vehemently opposing 
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, suppressed the ways in which white 
women and black women were differently situated. Ratification of the 
Amendment was most strongly opposed in the American South, where “the issue 
of white supremacy dominated all other political considerations.”18 When, on 
August 18, 1920, Tennessee became the decisive thirty-sixth state required for 
ratification of the Amendment, it was only the third of the eleven states of the 
former Confederacy to vote in favor of woman suffrage. Three geographers of the 
American South put the data into historical and cultural perspective: 
The South not only resisted the extension of voting rights to African 
Americans after the Civil War, but largely refused to ratify the Nineteenth 
Amendment enfranchising women in 1920. Of the 11 former Confederate 
states only the legislatures of Texas, Arkansas, and Tennessee voted in 
favor of the amendment. Fifty years later during the debates over the 
Equal Rights Amendment only the states of Tennessee and Arkansas 
voted in favor [of] amending the Constitution. Thus, the southern states 
have been historically resistant to the entry of all groups into the realm of 
political activity except for those white males already among the elite.19 
During the debate over the Nineteenth Amendment, some Southern 
politicians spoke as if they did not understand how, if the Nineteenth Amendment 
were ratified, they could continue to disenfranchise black women.20 They argued 
expressly that they could not sensibly preach defiance of the Fifteenth Amendment 
 
 18.  ALAN P. GRIMES, THE PURITAN ETHIC AND WOMAN SUFFRAGE 124 (1967). Notably, “the doctrine of 
white supremacy was not confined to the South alone in 1914,” id., nor was it confined to only one side of the 
debate over woman suffrage, see id. at 124–25. 
 19.  Gerald L. Ingalls, Gerald R. Webster & Jonathan I. Leib, Fifty Years of Political Change in the 
South: Electing African Americans and Women to Public Office, 37 SE. GEOGRAPHER 140, 141 (1997). 
 20.  Whether those Southern politicians actually did not understand the basic insight of intersectionality 
is another matter. As noted in the text, after ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, states that wanted to 
prevent African Americans (but not white women) from voting continued to succeed in doing so. 
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while supporting ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. As South Carolina 
Senator Ellison D. Smith stated bluntly on the Senate floor in 1919, in an extended, 
unapologetic outpouring of white supremacy, “Here is exactly the identical same 
amendment applied to the other half of the Negro race. The southern man who 
votes for the Susan B. Anthony Amendment votes to ratify the fifteenth 
amendment.”21 Smith deemed it his “duty” to “warn southern Democrats—
southern white men—that this day they solemnly ratify what they have for the last 
50 years denounced as the crime of the century”22—that is, the Fifteenth 
Amendment.23 As some suffragists had insisted, Smith’s professed concerns 
turned out to be unfounded: ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment did not 
disable states like his own from continuing to disenfranchise African Americans, 
women and men alike. Only white women were permitted to vote.24 
II. THE ROLES OF MEN AND FEDERALISM IN UNDERMINING AND ADVANCING 
WOMAN SUFFRAGE 
A. Men 
Men as a group, it should not be controversial to observe, have been primarily 
responsible for the social subordination of women over the course of millennia. In 
the United States, for example, it was men who decided at the time of the Founding 
that adult women would be citizens but would not be permitted to vote or to 
participate in other basic ways in the educational, economic, and political life of 
the nation—a state of affairs that Abigail Adams famously called out to her 
husband, John.25 As Justice Ginsburg pointedly remarked in her majority opinion 
in United States v. Virginia (a decision that is discussed in detail in Part III), Thomas 
Jefferson “stated the view prevailing when the Constitution was new”; he wrote 
in private correspondence in 1816 that “‘[w]ere our State a pure democracy . . . 
there would yet be excluded from their deliberations . . . [w]omen, who, to prevent 
depravation of morals and ambiguity of issue, could not mix promiscuously in the 
public meetings of men.’”26 It was men, most of whom eventually could vote, who 
 
 21.  58 CONG. REC. 618 (1919). 
 22.  Id. at 619. For additional expressions of virulent white supremacy by members of Congress 
opposed to woman suffrage, see GRIMES, supra note 18, at 126–27. 
 23.  For discussions of the contributions of African American women to the woman suffrage movement 
and the fight for gender equality more generally, see generally AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN AND THE VOTE 
(Ann D. Gordon et al. eds., 1997); ROSALYN TERBORG-PENN, AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE STRUGGLE 
FOR THE VOTE, 1850–1920 (1998). 
 24.  See KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 219 (“[T]he suffragists’ prediction that the enfranchisement of women 
would not jeopardize white supremacy in the South proved to be on the mark: although some (but not many) 
black women were able to register to vote, the Democratic Party remained firmly in power, segregation and 
black disenfranchisement persisted, and the federal government steered clear of voting rights issues for 
another four decades.”). 
 25.  See FAMILIAR LETTERS OF JOHN ADAMS AND HIS WIFE ABIGAIL ADAMS, DURING THE REVOLUTION 
148–150, 153–55, 168–70 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1876) (reproducing a letter from Abigail to John of 
March 31, 1776, John’s response of April 14, 1776, and Abigail’s reply of May 7, 1776). 
 26.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 n.5 (1996) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
Samuel Kercheval (Sept. 5, 1816), in 10 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 45–46, n.1 (Paul Leicester Ford 
ed., 1899)). 
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refused to elect politicians who would support gender equality, including woman 
suffrage. And it was conservative, traditionalist men in particular who most 
strongly opposed the Nineteenth Amendment and who succeeded in preventing 
its ratification until 1920, a mere one hundred years ago.27 
Less obvious, perhaps, has been the role of men in advancing women’s 
equality, including woman suffrage. Women such as Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton, Lucy Stone, and Alice Paul led the suffrage movement, but men 
also played pivotal roles. Most fundamentally, the Nineteenth Amendment had to 
garner the widespread support of male politicians in order to survive the 
extraordinarily demanding process of constitutional amendment. The Nineteenth 
Amendment followed the typical Article V procedure, earning the support of at 
least two-thirds of each house of Congress and three-quarters of the state 
legislatures, all but one of which (Nebraska) were bicameral.28 
Perhaps no one embodied the conflicting—and evolving—relationship of 
men to the woman suffrage movement than the first Southerner elected President 
since the Civil War, Woodrow Wilson of Virginia, whose deeply troubling views 
on race underwent no transformation even as his views on woman suffrage did.29  
Wilson began as an obstacle to women’s enfranchisement, labeling women who 
campaigned for suffrage “totally abhorrent” and believing that the issue should 
be left to the states.30 But a combination of factors—including daily picketing of 
the White House by the National Woman’s Party beginning in 1917, World War I, 
and, potentially, his daughter (suffragist Jessie Woodrow Wilson Sayre)—changed 
him, eventually prompting him to intervene in dramatic fashion to support the 
Nineteenth Amendment.31 
 
 27.  See KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 217 (noting that the Nineteenth Amendment’s “last-ditch opponents 
were almost entirely Southerners and old-stock, probusiness Republicans such as Henry Cabot Lodge”). 
 28.  U.S. CONST. art. V. Nebraska was the fourteenth state to ratify the Nineteenth Amendment (on 
August 2, 1919). 
 29.  See DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY 6–12 (2001) 
(describing Wilson’s speech on the battlefield at Gettysburg during the fiftieth anniversary Blue-Gray 
reunion, in which he said that “we shall not forget the splendid valor, the manly devotion of the men then 
arrayed against one another, now grasping hands and smiling into each other’s eyes”); see also, e.g., Dick Lehr, 
The Racist Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, ATLANTIC (Nov. 27, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2015/11/wilson-legacy-racism/417549/ (describing how Wilson oversaw unprecedented racial 
segregation in the executive branch and once threw William Monroe Trotter, an African American civil rights 
leader, out of the Oval Office). 
 30.  For discussions of Wilson’s evolution, see KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 213–17; Elizabeth Cobbs, 19th 
Amendment Anniversary: Evaluating Woodrow Wilson’s Complicated Contributions to Women’s Equality, 
NBC NEWS (Aug. 26, 2018, 10:20 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/19th-amendment-
anniversary-evaluating-woodrow-wilson-s-complicated-contributions-women-ncna903746; Global 
Women’s Leadership Initiative Staff, Woodrow Wilson and the Women’s Suffrage Movement: A Reflection, 
WILSON CTR. (June 4, 2013), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/woodrow-wilson-and-the-womens-
suffrage-movement-reflection; Women’s Suffrage and WWI, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/ 
articles/womens-suffrage-wwi.htm (last updated Oct. 15, 2018). 
 31.  See KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 214 (discussing the daily picketing of the White House beginning 
in January 1917 by the National Woman’s Party, whose members “carr[ied] signs contrasting Wilson’s 
broadly stated democratic utterances with his position on women’s suffrage”); Global Women’s 
Leadership Initiative Staff, supra note 30 (discussing the three factors identified in the text in describing 
Wilson’s “ethical metamorphosis” on the issue of woman suffrage). 
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On September 30, 1918, Wilson appeared personally before the Senate. In his 
brief, powerful address to “Mr. Vice President and gentlemen of the Senate,” he 
framed ratification as critical to the cause of American victory and leadership in 
World War I and to American leadership on the world stage after the war: 
Through many, many channels I have been made aware what the plain, 
struggling, workaday folk are thinking, upon whom the chief terror and 
suffering of this tragic war falls.  They are looking to the great, powerful, 
famous Democracy of the West to lead them to the new day for which they 
have so long waited; and they think, in their logical simplicity, that 
democracy means that women shall play their part in affairs alongside 
men and upon an equal footing with them.  If we reject measures like this, 
in ignorance or defiance of what a new age has brought forth, of what they 
have seen but we have not, they will cease to follow or to trust us. . . . 
Are we alone to refuse to learn the lesson?  Are we alone to ask and take 
the utmost that women can give,—service and sacrifice of every kind,—
and still say that we do not see what title that gives them to stand by our 
sides in the guidance of the affairs of their nation and ours?  We have made 
partners of the women in this war; shall we admit them only to a 
partnership of sacrifice and suffering and toil and not to a partnership of 
privilege and of right?  This war could not have been fought, either by 
other nations engaged or by America, if it had not been for the services of 
the women,—services rendered in every sphere,—not merely in the fields 
of effort in which we have been accustomed to see them work, but 
wherever men have worked and upon the very skirts and edges of the 
battle itself.  We shall not only be distrusted but shall deserve to be 
distrusted if we do not enfranchise them with the fullest possible 
enfranchisement, as it is now certain that the other great free nations will 
enfranchise them.  We cannot isolate our thought or our action in such a 
matter from the thought of the rest of the world.  We must either conform 
or deliberately reject what they propose and resign the leadership of 
liberal minds to others.32 
In those rich passages, Wilson emphasized the fierce loyalty of American women; 
the fundamental fairness of enfranchising them in recognition of their many 
sacrifices on behalf of the nation; the basic capacity of women to occupy roles 
traditionally occupied by men, including in the sphere of public affairs; and the 
critical importance of paying “a decent respect to the opinions of [human]kind,” 
to (not) coin a phrase.33 The Nineteenth Amendment, Wilson urged, was “vital to 
the winning of the war and to the energies alike of preparation and of battle,” as 
well as “to the right solution of the great problems which we must settle, and settle 
 
 32.  President Woodrow Wilson, Equal Suffrage: Address of the President of the United States, 
Delivered in the Senate of the United States (Sept. 30, 1918), at 2, 3, https://www.senate.gov/ artandhistory/ 
history/resources/pdf/WilsonSpeech1918.pdf. Strikingly, Wilson did not view the race situation in the 
United States as threatening the moral leadership of the United States in World War I or beyond. A few 
decades later, the State Department in the Brown litigation would have a very different view of the 
matter. See generally Mary L. Dudziak, Brown as a Cold War Case, 91 J. AM. HIST. 32 (2004). 
 33.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S., 1776). 
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immediately, when the war is over.”34 Wars have historically been helpful to 
advocates of expanded suffrage in the United States, and World War I was no 
exception. 
There may be a lesson here about the necessary roles of both women and men 
in the broader struggle for gender equality. Of course, women cannot simply wait 
for a sufficient number of men to decide when it is time to afford women full 
inclusion and equality in public life; that is not the story of the Nineteenth 
Amendment. But nor, in all likelihood, can women achieve such inclusion and 
equality on their own in the face of unrelenting opposition or indifference from 
men. Fathers, husbands, sons, and male colleagues and friends also need to step 
up, as many of them eventually did in voting for the Nineteenth Amendment, and 
as many of them also did a half-century later in supporting second-wave 
feminism’s attacks on traditional gender roles. Relevant in that regard is the 
frequency with which Justice Ginsburg credits her late husband, Marty Ginsburg, for 
facilitating her professional career by recognizing its worth and by being fully present 
at home (and doing the cooking).35 
Then-Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg understood well, in part from her time 
in Sweden, that if women were going to have more opportunities outside the 
home, then men would need to assume more caregiving responsibilities inside the 
home (among other things).36 Decades later, when an admiring woman visited 
 
 34.  Wilson, supra note 32, at 4. To be clear, Wilson’s views remained deeply gendered: 
We shall need [when the war is over] a vision of affairs which is theirs, and, as we have never 
needed them before, the sympathy and insight and clear moral instinct of the women of the 
world. . . . We shall need their moral sense to preserve what is right and fine and worthy in 
our system of life as well as to discover just what it is that ought to be purified and reformed. 
Id. See Melissa Murray, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Century in the Making Symposium Foreword, 43 REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE HARBINGER 91, 92 (2019) (“For many, women’s enfranchisement was not animated by an 
unalloyed commitment to women’s equality, but rather by the view that women—the virtuous sex—
were uniquely positioned to purify and uplift the tenor of American politics.”). Some suffragists made 
gender essentialist appeals. See KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 188 (noting the emergence in the 1870s of a “more 
essentialist strand of argument: that women possessed particular qualities or virtues that would improve the 
character of politics and governance,” and observing that “[s]uch views began to be uttered by Stanton and 
other suffragists in the late 1860s”). 
 35.  See, e.g., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Conversation with Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
University of Colorado Law School Annual Stevens Lecture (Sept. 19, 2012), in 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 909, 
913 (2013) (“I was blessed for fifty-six years, married to a man who thought my work was as important 
as his—and who was a great chef.”);  Stephanie Francis Ward, Family Ties, the Private and Public Lives of 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 96 A.B.A. J. 37, 38 (2010) (stating, in talking about success in her career and 
in raising her children, that “[i]t really does take a man who regards his wife as his best friend, his 
equal, his true partner in life”); id. at 43 (“Many who knew the couple say his admiration and support 
for his wife, coupled with their determination to share home responsibilities, played a large role in 
Ginsburg’s success, both as a parent and a lawyer, and define who she is today.”); Irin Carmon, Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg on Marriage, Sexism and Pushups, MSNBC (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.msnbc.com/ 
msnbc/ruth-bader-ginsburg-marriage-sexism-and-pushups (“‘In the course of a marriage, one 
accommodates the other,’ Ginsburg said. ‘So, for example, when Marty was intent on becoming a 
partner in a New York law firm in five years, during that time, I was the major caretaker of our home 
and then child. But when I started up the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, Marty realized how 
important that work was.’”); see also generally RBG (Magnolia Pictures 2018), https://www.imdb.com/title/ 
tt7689964/. 
 36.  See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. 
Prof. Siegel- FINAL PAGE PROOF 0306 (Do Not Delete) 3/6/2020  9:15 AM 
246 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 27:235 2020 
Justice Ginsburg’s chambers (during the year in which the author clerked for her) 
and remarked that her feminist girlfriends just loved the Justice for what she had 
done for American women, Ginsburg responded that she hoped the woman’s male 
friends loved her as well.37 Part of her point may have been that women, in order 
to advance, require the support of men. But another part of her point may have 
been that she worked to liberate men as well as women from the constraints of 
traditional sex-role stereotypes—work that every present father can appreciate. A 
key part of her litigation strategy was thus to bring cases on behalf of caregiving 
men.38 Put differently, the stereotypes that supported male suffrage and the denial 
of woman suffrage also confined men.  
Fortunately, men and women both increasingly understand that no one wins 
under a regime of gender-role stereotyping. Indeed, “[w]omen’s issues continue 
to show a lack of a gender gap in most cases.”39 And both men and women have 
 
L. REV. 83, 88–89 (2010) (“Ginsburg derived the anti-stereotyping principle in part from the philosophy 
of John Stuart Mill and the policy innovations of Sweden, which began in the early 1960s to wage an 
ambitious, decades-long campaign against sex-role enforcement.”). 
 37.  See Neil S. Siegel, “Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s Constitutional Vision, 43 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 799, 855 (2009) (recounting that story) [hereinafter Siegel, Equal Citizenship Stature]. 
 38.  See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Moritz v. Comm’r, 469 F.2d 466 (10th 
Cir. 1972).  For discussions of why Ginsburg represented male plaintiffs (especially male caregivers), 
see Franklin, supra note 36, at 120–25; Neil S. Siegel, The Pregnant Captain, the Notorious REG, and the 
Vision of RBG: The Story of Struck v. Secretary of Defense, in REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE STORIES, 
33 47–48 (Melissa Murray, Kate Shaw, & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2019). 
 39.  Barbara Norrander, The History of the Gender Gaps, in VOTING THE GENDER GAP 9, 14 (Lois Duke 
Whitaker ed., 2008).  See id. at 13–14 (discussing, as of 2004, polling data surveying the views of men and 
women on the role of women in society, abortion, support for the Equal Rights Amendment, and whether 
they would vote for a woman candidate for President).  More recent data paint a similar picture.  For example, 
in 2016, 93 percent of men and 97 percent of women respondents favored equal pay for women. 2016 
Time Series Study, AM. NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES, https://electionstudies.org/data-center/2016-time-ser 
ies-study/ (Variable: V162149) (Question wording: “Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose 
requiring employers to pay women and men the same amount for the same work?”). See also id. 
(Variable: V162230x) (Question wording: “Do you think it is better, worse, or makes no difference for 
the family as a whole if the man works outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and 
family?”).  The responses did not reveal a significant gender gap: 
 
2016 Scale % Men % Women 
 
1 (Better) 20 22 
 
2 13 12 
 
3 9 5 
 
4 52 57 
 
5 2 1 
 
6 0 0 
  7 (Worse) 0 0 
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become more gender egalitarian over time.40 
B. Virtual (Mis)Representation 
A longstanding justification for preventing adult female citizens from voting 
sounded in virtual representation: women, it was asserted, were adequately 
represented in the political process by their husbands, who were the heads of their 
households.41 Virtual representation, of course, had previously been England’s 
response to the American colonial mantra of “no taxation without 
representation.”42 The political leaders of the American colonies were 
 
 40.  See Time Series Cumulative Data File, AM. NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES, https://electionstudies.org/ 
data-center/anes-time-series-cumulative-data-file/ (Variable: VCF0834) (Question wording: “Some 
people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry and 
government. Others feel that women’s place is in the home. Where would you place yourself on this 
scale or haven’t you thought much about this?”). Respondents were given 7-point scale, with 1-3 
representing those who lean towards an equal role for men and women and 5-7 representing those 
who fall towards the view that women’s place is in the home. 4 was neutral. The percentage reported 









1972 51 46 
1974 56 51 
1976 59 52 
1978 63 57 
1980 62 62 
1982 61 62 
1984 62 57 
1988 68 68 
1992 74 74 
1994 72 67 
1996 77 77 
1998 82 74 
2000 75 81 
2004 80 83 
2008 84 85 
 
 41.  For a discussion of American men’s persistent claims for virtual representation of women, see 
Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 947, 991–93 (2002) [hereinafter Siegel, She the People]. 
 42.  For a discussion of the Crown’s claims for virtual representation of the American colonists, see 
JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 67–72 (2011). 
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unpersuaded by that response, and those men risked their “Lives, . . . Fortunes 
and . . . sacred Honor” in a war of independence rather than resign themselves to 
a regime of virtual representation.43 But when the existential risk they took was 
rewarded and they established a new nation, those same men (and others), in line 
with the received English common law of marital status (or coverture), determined  
that virtual representation was sufficient for adult female citizens of the new 
nation.44 
It might be thought that the role of men in helping secure ratification of the 
Nineteenth Amendment illustrates that the virtual representation argument had 
something going for it.45 At both the state and federal levels, it was male politicians 
who eventually voted to enfranchise women. One could make a similar argument 
about the extent to which the American colonies were in fact virtually represented 
in Parliament, given that at least some of those unpopular taxes were arguably 
paying for services (especially military defense) that the colonists had previously 
received from the Crown. 
The basic problem in both instances, however, was that virtual representation 
was not nearly as representative as actual representation, either expressively or 
materially. The influential British statesman Edmund Burke recognized that a 
British Parliament an ocean away could not competently represent the American 
colonies virtually.46 And the inadequacy of virtual representation in the case of 
gender relations was unwittingly made plain by the alternative argument of 
opponents of woman suffrage that permitting women to vote would cause discord 
in the family when husbands and wives disagreed about political matters!47 (A 
potential problem with arguments in the alternative outside the context of 
litigation is that they are actually inconsistent with one another.) No one would 
credit a virtual representation argument in the case of race just because white 
Americans voted to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment. 
 
 43.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776). 
 44.  The common law understood the relationship between husband and wife as falling within the 
realm of “domestic relations.” According to the common law rules of coverture (or marital status), a husband 
was entitled to the labor of his wife, whether paid or uncompensated, as well as to most property that she 
brought into the marriage. A wife was required to obey her husband, and he was required to support her 
and represent her in the legal system. Wives were prohibited from suing in court or making contracts without 
the approval of their husbands. Husbands were legally liable for much of the conduct of their wives. The 
common law entertained the legal fiction of marital unity, so that a woman’s legal existence was “‘suspended 
during the marriage.’” See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 186 (6th ed. 2015) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430 (1765)). 
 45.  See AMAR, supra note 3, at 422 (“The ultimate success of the indefatigable suffragists ironically 
proved that the old saw—that men would virtually represent the interests of women—contained at least a 
grain of truth. For had all men been implacably indifferent to the voices of women, suffrage would never 
have happened.”). In fairness, Professor Amar then immediately acknowledges that, “[o]f course, if virtual 
representation was a half-truth, it was also a half-lie.”  Id. 
 46.  For a discussion of the ways in which Burke’s own support for virtual representation was 
qualified, including his view that it was not possible in the case of America, see James Conniff, Burke, 
Bristol, and the Concept of Representation, 30 W. POL. Q. 329, 338–39 (1977). For a discussion of Burke’s 
views on the role responsibilities of elected representatives, see Neil S. Siegel, After the Trump Era: A 
Constitutional Role Morality for Presidents and Members of Congress, 107 GEO. L.J. 109, 129–32 (2018). 
 47.  See Siegel, She the People, supra note 41, at 993–97. 
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Throughout American history, virtual representation arguments have 
ultimately been losing arguments. That is in no small measure because the United 
States—with important exceptions48—has tended to become more democratic over 
long periods of time, not less so.49 Americans might bear that lesson in mind in 
contemporary debates over statehood for Puerto Rico and the District of 
Columbia, as well as debates over other restrictions on the franchise. One should 
be very loath to conclude that certain groups of people in the United States are 
sufficiently represented virtually by another group of people. For example, 
seventeen-year-olds will live with the effects of climate change, school shootings, 
budget deficits, and partisan polarization for far longer than seventy-year-olds.50 
C. Federalism 
Although the political orientation of men toward the Nineteenth Amendment is a 
very different phenomenon from the operation of the American federal system, 
they share an interesting similarity. Federalism, too, both reduced and enhanced 
the prospects of ratifying the Nineteenth Amendment. Opponents of the 
Amendment invoked federalism values in arguing that, by a longstanding 
tradition of respect for states’ rights, the states should continue to decide for 
themselves whether and when to allow women to vote.51 The relationship between 
husband and wife, like the relationship between slave owner and slave and 
between employer and employee, had long been conceived of as part of state 
domestic relations law.52 Some prominent opponents of woman suffrage asserted 
 
 48.  For examples of contractions in the right to vote at different points in American history, see 
generally KEYSSAR, supra note 7. 
 49.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XV (prohibition on race-based disenfranchisements), XVII (popular 
election of U.S. Senators), XIX (woman’s suffrage), XXIII (presidential electors for the District of Columbia), 
XXIV (abolition of poll tax qualification to vote in federal elections), XXVI (reduction of voting age 
qualification to eighteen). Of course, statutes like the Voting Rights Act of 1965 have also playing a pivotal 
role in making the United States more compliant (although far from fully compliant) with modern 
democratic norms. 
 50.  Lack of capacity is the traditional justification for excluding minors from voting; in many areas, the 
law distinguishes between the child who must learn and the adult who can choose. But it is not clear that the 
capacity line should be drawn at eighteen years old, U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, especially given the contrast 
between the views of most teenagers and the views of most older Americans on a range of public issues. See, 
e.g., QUINNIPIAC UNIV. POLL, MAJORITY OF VOTERS SAY CLIMATE CHANGE IS AN EMERGENCY QUINNIPIAC 
UNIVERSITY POLL FINDS; 72% SAY CONGRESS NEEDS TO ACT TO REDUCE GUN VIOLENCE 1 (Aug. 29, 2019), 
https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=3639 (“A majority of registered voters nationwide, 
56 percent, say that climate change is an emergency, while 42 percent do not. . . . Among 18 to 34 year 
old voters, who may expect to be the most affected by climate change, 74 percent say that climate 
change is an emergency, while 24 percent do not.”); Kim Parker et al., Generation Z Looks a Lot Like 
Millennials on Key Social and Political Issues, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.pewsocial 
trends.org/2019/01/17/generation-z-looks-a-lot-like-millennials-on-key-social-and-political-issues/ (“On a 
range of issues, from Donald Trump’s presidency to the role of government to racial equality and 
climate change, the views of Gen Z—those ages thirteen to twenty-one in 2018— mirror those of 
Millennials. In each of these realms, the two younger generations hold views that differ significantly 
from those of their older counterparts.”). 
 51.  See Siegel, She the People, supra note 41, at 997–1003 (canvassing the federalism objections of 
opponents of the Nineteenth Amendment). 
 52.  See generally Janet Halley, What Is Family Law? A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2011) 
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that enfranchising women via an Article V amendment would impermissibly 
involve the national government in domestic matters.53 
As discussed in Part I, moreover, Southern states were (with few exceptions) 
steadfastly opposed to the Nineteenth Amendment. They likewise fervently 
fought to prevent the end of slavery, the Black Codes, and Jim Crow, and they 
rejected second-wave feminism and, more recently, the application of anti-
discrimination norms to sexual orientation minorities. There are forceful historical 
and contemporary reasons why progressives tend to code federalism arguments 
as bigotry masquerading as something structurally more dignified. 
And yet, the full story of the Nineteenth Amendment paints a more complex 
picture of the relationship between federalism and equality. It illustrates the 
potential (albeit contingent) of federalism dynamics to advance the equal 
citizenship stature of traditionally excluded groups. Beginning with Wyoming 
Territory in 1869, Western territories and states increasingly sought to entice 
women living in Eastern states to move west, in part to increase their populations 
and enhance their chances of obtaining statehood.54 Notably, when Utah Territory 
permitted women to vote in 1870, many Mormon men supported the legislation 
in part because they thought it would show the rest of the country that women 
were not subordinated by the practice of polygamy.55 As women gained the 
franchise and voted in Western territories and states, Americans saw that the 
doomsday predictions had no basis in reality.56 The institution of marriage was 
made more egalitarian by woman suffrage, but it was hardly destroyed, and the 
same was true of the American federal system. That experimentation and result 
were possible only because the federalism of the time permitted Western 
territories and states to give women the right to vote. 
More recently, advocates of marriage equality—which, among other things, 
is an issue of gender equality57—achieved significant successes at the state level 
before obtaining favorable decisions from the federal courts at the national level, 
and the chronology is likely important and causally related.58 The legislative and 
 
(offering an account of how the law of Domestic Relations emerged as a distinct field in American law in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century); see also PAUL BREST ET AL., supra note 44, at 186 (discussing the 
common law rules of coverture). 
 53.  See, e.g., HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, Meaning of Local Self-Government, in WOMAN’S SUFFRAGE BY 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 106 (1916) (Storrs Lectures). 
 54.  See AMAR, supra note 3, at 419–22. 
 55.  See, e.g., Utah and the 19th Amendment, NAT’L PARK SERV., (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.nps.gov/ 
articles/utah-women-s-history.htm. 
 56.  See KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 193 (“By the mid-1870s, proponents frequently invoked the precedent 
of Wyoming, where women voted and nothing calamitous had occurred.”). 
 57.  Not only did state prohibitions on same-sex marriage discriminate facially on the basis of sex 
(because who a person could marry depended on one’s sex or the sex of one’s partner), but some arguments 
against same-sex marriage sound in traditional sex-role stereotypes about men and women, including 
the stereotype that people are “supposed” to be attracted to members of the opposite sex. See, e.g., 
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Viewed through the lens of the gender 
non-conformity line of cases, Hively represents the ultimate case of failure to conform to the female 
stereotype (at least as understood in a place such as modern America, which views heterosexuality as 
the norm and other forms of sexuality as exceptional): she is not heterosexual.”). 
 58.  For a discussion of how the operation of the American federal system advanced the cause of same-
Prof. Siegel- FINAL PAGE PROOF 0306 (Do Not Delete) 3/6/2020  9:15 AM 
 WHY THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT MATTERS TODAY 251 
judicial record that developed over time amply demonstrated the falsity of the 
claims by opponents of same-sex marriage that gay people posed a danger to 
children; that children raised by same-sex couples fared worse than children raised 
by opposite-sex couples; and that permitting gay people to marry would degrade 
the status of the institution of marriage, including by causing heterosexuals not to 
marry. In the cases of both woman suffrage and same-sex marriage, the once-
unthinkable was not only thought, but also acted upon at the state level before the 
national level—and Americans saw with their own eyes that the sky did not fall. 
III. CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
A. Suffrage Restrictions as Status-Based Regulations 
A vitally important point for Americans today, including legislators and legal 
professionals, to understand about past restrictions on the franchise is that those 
restrictions were regulations of social status. As Professor Reva Siegel has 
explained, having the right to vote meant holding a superior social status in the 
family and in American society; lacking the right to vote meant holding an inferior 
social status in the family and in American society.59 Most adult male citizens had 
the right to vote (although, as noted in Part I, not propertyless white men initially 
and not African American men for much longer), because they were viewed as the 
heads of their households and so were thought to possess sufficient independence 
to exercise the franchise responsibly. Adult female citizens lacked the right to vote 
because, as also explained in Part I, they were regarded as dependent on their 
husbands for their subsistence and so were deemed to lack sufficient 
independence to vote responsibly.60 Suffrage restrictions largely tracked the 
distinction between breadwinners and caregivers that defined the ideology of 
separate spheres for men and women. According to that ideology, men were 
destined for the world of education, the market, and public affairs while women 
were destined for the world of raising children, attending to their husbands, and 
maintaining a household.61 
Suffragists understood that voting restrictions were status-based regulations.  
They insisted that freeing women educationally, economically, and politically 
 
sex marriage, see generally Ernest A. Young, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty as Federalism Strategies: Lessons from 
the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1133 (2014). 
 59.  See Siegel, She the People, supra note 41, at 977–97; see also BREST ET AL., supra note 44, at 186. 
 60.  See generally Siegel, Collective Memory and the Nineteenth Amendment, supra note 10. 
 61.  In Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873), the Supreme Court rejected Myra Bradwell’s claim that an 
Illinois law prohibiting women from practicing law violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause. In a since-notorious concurrence, Justice Bradley read the Fourteenth Amendment in 
light of the common law of marital status and the ideology of separate spheres, and he invoked God as 
authority for the separate spheres tradition. See id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring) (“The paramount destiny 
and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.  This is the law of 
the Creator.”). A century later, Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg would write of Bradwell that “the method of 
communication between the Creator and the jurist is never disclosed,” and that “‘divine ordinance’ has 
been a dominant theme in decisions justifying laws establishing sex-based classifications.” Brief for the 
Petitioner at 39, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 72–178), 1972 WL 135840. For a 
discussion of the ideology of the separate spheres, see DANIEL FARBER & NEIL S. SIEGEL, UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 238, 324–25 (2019). 
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required freeing them from their inferior social status within the family.62 Voting 
rights were a critical part of their campaign for emancipation, and the Nineteenth 
Amendment was the eventual fruit of their labors. Were the Amendment 
understood today as its champions understood it then, it would be viewed as a 
crucial means of combatting the social subordination of women to men in the 
family and in public life.63 Rather than merely setting forth a decision rule 
regarding voting, the Amendment would be viewed as more akin to a Declaration 
of Independence—beyond a Declaration of Sentiments64—for female citizens of 
the United States.65 As explored below, if that non-stingy reading were accepted, 
the reference to voting in the Amendment would be understood capaciously, and 
that reference would also be understood to illustrate, but not to exhaust, the 
meaning and implications of the Amendment. 
B. The Race-Sex Analogy 
The Supreme Court has not, however, grounded its modern equal protection, 
sex discrimination jurisprudence in the Nineteenth Amendment. The Court has, 
rather, grounded that jurisprudence in the race-sex analogy first developed by 
Pauli Murray66 and given constitutional form by Ruth Bader Ginsburg.67  
According to the race-sex analogy, the sex-role stereotypes of the separate spheres 
 
 62.  For a discussion of the claims on both sides of the debate over woman suffrage, see generally 
KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 172–221; Siegel, She the People, supra note 41. 
 63.  For expressions of antisubordination understandings of equality, see Catherine A. 
MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON 
LIFE AND LAW 32, 38 (1987); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
107, 151 (1976); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–76 (2004); see also Jack M. Balkin & 
Reva B Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 9, 10 (2003); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Principle and Practice of Women’s “Full Citizenship”: A Case Study 
of Sex-Segregated Public Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755, 769–79 (2002). 
 64.  The first social movements for women’s rights in United States history culminated in the first 
women’s rights convention, which took place at Seneca Falls, New York, in July 1848. The Declaration of 
Sentiments adopted by the convention, as well as Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s Keynote Address, sought to 
secure for women the same equal political and economic rights that radical abolitionists were then seeking 
for African American men. See Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions, Seneca Falls Convention (1848), 
https://www.nps.gov/wori/learn/historyculture/declaration-of-sentiments.htm; Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 
Keynote Address at the Seneca Falls Convention (July 19, 1848), https://susanbanthonyhouse.org/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/Elizabeth-Cady-Stanton-Seneca-Falls-1848.pdf. 
 65.  Cf. Murray, supra note 34, at 91–92, 98 (discussing suffragist Crystal Eastman, who declared both 
purposefully and wistfully that “Now We Can Begin Again” after the 19th Amendment was ratified and 
she began working on the Equal Rights Amendment, because she realized that the Nineteenth 
Amendment would not generally be read nearly as broadly as suffragists had intended it) (quoting 
Crystal Eastman, Now We Can Begin, LIBERATOR, Dec. 1920). 
 66.  See generally Pauli Murray, The Negro Woman’s Stake in the Equal Rights Amendment, 6 HARV. C.R.- 
C.L. L. REV. 253 (1971). 
 67.  See, e.g., Brief for Appellant, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Ginsburg included Murray as a 
signatory on Ginsburg’s brief in Reed.  For an account of the intellectual relationship between the two, see 
SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 58–63 (2014); 
id. at 61 (“In Reed, Ginsburg translated the analogical arguments that Pauli Murray had proposed almost a 
decade earlier into a document that would become known as the ‘grandmother brief.’”). 
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tradition cause harms that are analogous to those caused by racial stereotypes. On 
that view, both kinds of stereotypes erase the individuality of, and differences 
between, members of the group in question and simply ascribe certain 
characteristics, including negative characteristics, to all of them. 
Grounding the Court’s constitutional sex equality jurisprudence in the race-
sex analogy had analytical and strategic advantages. Women, like African 
Americans, had suffered a long history of subordination and exclusion that was 
tolerated under the Constitution. Women, like African Americans, had lacked 
political power to remedy the discrimination to which they had long been subject.  
Sex, like race, was regarded as immutable and was mostly irrelevant to the ability 
of individuals to contribute to society. Those were the four criteria of suspect-ness 
that the Supreme Court had invoked to explain why racial classifications trigger 
heightened judicial scrutiny while almost all other classifications do not.68 Notably, 
moreover, the constitutional litigation was occurring at a time when a nearly all-
male federal judiciary was taking racial discrimination seriously and needed to be 
persuaded that sex discrimination was not invariably benign.69 
But there were also problems with reasoning from race in order to convince 
courts to combat the subordination of women. Racism and sexism in America have 
traditionally employed different means to enforce a status hierarchy: segregation is 
not the same thing as role differentiation, and degradation/disdain is not the same 
thing as paternalism. Moreover, certain biological differences between men and 
women are real (even though their relevance has traditionally been vastly overstated), 
while asserted biological differences between people of different races almost never 
have any basis in science or medicine. In addition, the race-sex analogy—at least as the 
Supreme Court has deployed it—does not capture the issue of intersectionality, 
discussed in Part I (although Pauli Murray herself did use the analogy in ways that 
made the intersections legible). And perhaps most critically, as Professor Reva Siegel 
has continuously underscored, the race-sex analogy unwittingly deprived the 
Court’s equal protection, sex discrimination jurisprudence of the dignity, 
legitimacy, and analytical orientation that, in the American tradition, accompanies 
the interpretative community’s recognition that a body of constitutional doctrine 
 
 68.  For a discussion of most of those criteria, see, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685–88 
(1973). Most controversial today, although obviously not prior to ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, 
is whether women as a group are fairly characterized as politically powerless for equal protection purposes. 
On one hand, they constitute a numerical majority of the electorate and can vote as a group if they so choose. 
On the other hand, a distinct minority of Americans in positions of power in economic, educational, and 
political life are women, and American culture—in which girls and boys are socialized—remains deeply 
gendered in ways that limit opportunities for women. As discussed in Part IV, for example, to this day 
women are expected to care for children and ill family members to an extent that men are not. 
 69.  During the 1970s, the Supreme Court learned from the women’s movement and in turn sought to 
educate the lower federal courts and the public: 
There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex 
discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 
“romantic paternalism” which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a 
cage. . . . As a result of notions such as these, our statute books gradually became laden with 
gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th 
century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of 
blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.  
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684–85 (footnote omitted). 
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possesses a constitutional history all its own, as opposed to a history borrowed 
from elsewhere or no history at all.70 According to the conventional wisdom 
among academic constitutional lawyers, everybody knows that the Fourteenth 
Amendment originally aimed to make citizens of slaves and afford them equal 
civil rights, not to protect women in any way. 
That argument from original intent (although not necessarily from the text or 
the original semantic meaning71) is true as far as it goes. But it does not go far 
enough because the relevant founding history did not end with the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 or the Fifteenth Amendment two years later.  
On the contrary, the exclusion of women from the protections of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, first in Congress72 and then in the Supreme Court,73 
catalyzed a half-century debate over the “woman question” that ultimately 
culminated in the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment.74 Those many 
decades of struggle—of cultural and constitutional contest over gender roles in the 
family and over the legitimate claims of states to shape those roles—ended with 
the conferral of federal constitutional voting rights upon women. Self-consciously 
echoing the language of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Nineteenth Amendment 
disabled states from denying adult female citizens the right to vote just because 
they were female. 
C. Alternative Approaches 
What might it look like to analyze questions of constitutional sex equality in 
a way that is attentive to the pre- and post-ratification histories of the Fourteenth, 
Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments? Two alternative approaches are briefly 
explored below. The first is structural, and the second is synthetic. Both are 
relatively common in constitutional law, which partially answers the objection 
that they license too much interpretive discretion. 
First, the Nineteenth Amendment could be read not literally but 
structurally—that is, in light of its underlying purpose and its role in the 
constitutional structure. In determining the basic purpose of the Amendment, 
 
 70.  See generally Reva B. Siegel, The Nineteenth Amendment and the Democratization of the Family, 129 YALE 
L.J.F. 450 (2020) [hereinafter Siegel, Democratization of the Family]; Siegel, She the People, supra note 41, at 949, 
953–60. 
 71.  The Equal Protection Clause refers to “any person,” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, and women are 
people. As for original meaning, see generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) (distinguishing 
the original semantic meaning of the language of the constitutional text, which may exist at a very high level 
of abstraction, from the original intent or expected application of the words of the text, which typically exists 
at a much lower level of abstraction). 
 72.  See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text (discussing the rejection of claims for woman suffrage 
by prominent abolitionists and the Reconstruction Congress). 
 73.  The post-Civil War Supreme Court was unreceptive to claims of gender equality. After ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and continuing for much of the next century, the Court permitted state action 
discriminating between men and women as rationally reflecting real, natural differences in the roles of men 
and women. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873), discussed supra note 61. Two years later, in Minor 
v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875), the Court rejected Frances Minor’s constitutional claim that the Privilege or 
Immunities Clause guaranteed women the right to vote. The distinction between the public and private 
realms was invoked to justify prohibiting women from voting. 
 74.  See generally Siegel, Democratization of the Family, supra note 70; Siegel, She the People, supra note 41. 
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interpreters could consult its pre- and post-ratification history, which (from the 
perspective of the subordinate group, as opposed to the superordinate group) 
reveals an animating objective to free women from subordination to men in the 
family and in political life. Structural interpreters of a relatively strict originalist 
orientation could obviously focus on the pre-ratification history of the three 
Amendments. Interpreters who believe that the authoritative meaning of those 
(and other) constitutional provisions does and should change over time could 
consult both the pre- and post-ratification history of those amendments, including 
the constitutional commitments of second-wave feminism in the 1960s and 70s. To 
be sure, the history, like other sources of constitutional argument, is not fully 
determinate; originalists and evolutionary constitutionalists alike would have to 
exercise at least some interpretive judgment and normative discretion in the 
present. But drawing attention to the existence of relevant constitutional history 
would help to legitimate the interpretive exercise, and using it would help to guide 
interpreters as they sought to discern what is—and is not—a question of 
constitutional sex equality covered by the Nineteenth Amendment.75 The history 
would also offer interpreters normative guidance as they wrestled with how to 
resolve such questions. 
As noted, non-literal, non-stingy interpretation of constitutional amendments 
is a relatively common practice. Consider, for example, the First Amendment, 
which begins by declaring that “Congress shall make no law.”76 Read literally, it is 
directed at “Congress” alone, not “the United States” or the “federal government,” 
and the Constitution even defines “Congress” as “consist[ing] of a Senate and House 
of Representatives.”77 Yet for structural, purposive, and other reasons, the 
Amendment has always been understood also to regulate the conduct of the President 
and the federal courts.78  
Consider next the Second Amendment, which provides that “[a] well-regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”79 In District of Columbia v. Heller,80 the majority 
and the dissent debated, among other things, the basic purpose and structural function 
of the Second Amendment, including whether it is a federalism provision that limits 
federal interference with state militias. That debate informed their diverging positions 
on the relationship between the prefatory clause and the operative clause of the 
Amendment.81 
The Eleventh Amendment offers yet another example. It provides that “[t]he 
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law 
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”82 The Supreme Court 
 
 75.  See Siegel, Democratization of the Family, supra note 70, at 482. 
 76.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 77.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1. 
 78.  For a discussion, see Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional 
Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1243–47 (2015). 
 79.  See U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 80. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 81.  See id. at 577–78, 598–600; id. at 637, 640–44, 651–52 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 82.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
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protects state sovereign immunity from private lawsuits well beyond what the 
semantic meaning of the language of the Amendment can bear. In doing so, the 
Court has not disputed that the text covers only suits by out-of-state residents and 
foreign citizens, or that it applies only to suits in the federal courts. But, because 
of a mix of historical, structural, purposive, and consequentialist considerations, 
the Court has rejected the position that the Amendment is best read as a 
comprehensive provision, as opposed to a targeted response to Chisholm v. Georgia, 
in which the Court permitted a state to be sued without its consent by a citizen of 
another state.83 In other words, the Court has rejected the negative inference that 
the Eleventh Amendment operates as a ceiling on the extent of the states’ 
immunity from suit. The Court instead enforces a structural principle of state 
sovereign immunity.84 It insists that focusing exclusively on the words of the 
Eleventh Amendment would amount to “ahistorical literalism.”85 
As for the Nineteenth Amendment, one plausible purposive and structural 
interpretation—one that does not license substantial interpretive discretion—is 
that it protects women not only from sex discrimination in voting, but also confers 
upon them (and, in Section Two, empowers Congress to protect) other political 
rights. They include the rights to serve equally with men on juries (jurors vote too), 
and to run for political office (and thereby be voted for). During the second half of 
the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, serving on juries and 
running for elective office were established political rights that were thought to 
accompany voting rights for African Americans, even if those rights were not 
being respected by Southern states. It stands to reason that the same implications 
should follow when women, by an amendment that mimicked the language of the 
Fifteenth Amendment, were finally afforded similar constitutional protection from 
discrimination in voting in elections.86 
In addition (or alternatively) to structural interpretation, the Nineteenth 
Amendment could be interpreted synthetically with the Equal Protection Clause. 
Synthetic constitutional interpretation commends reading one constitutional 
provision in light of another. One variant of synthetic interpretation is what 
Professor Akhil Amar calls “intratextualism,” which counsels interpreters to 
interpret a word or phrase in the Constitution partly in light of its meaning in 
another part of the Constitution.87 Like structural interpretation, synthetic 
interpretation is also relatively common in constitutional law. For example, in 
Heller, the majority and the dissent debated the meaning of the phrase “the people” 
in the Second Amendment partly in light of the meaning of the same phrase in 
other amendments in the Bill of Rights.88 In equal protection, race discrimination 
cases, the Court reads the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in light of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.89 In substantive due 
 
 83.  Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
 84.  For a discussion, see Bradley & Siegel, supra note 78, at 1252–56. 
 85.  Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1498 (2019). 
 86.  See AMAR, supra note 3, at 399–400, 426–28 (explicating the implications of ratifying the Fifteenth 
and Nineteenth Amendments for the political rights of African Americans and women, respectively). 
 87.  See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999). 
 88.  See Heller, 544 U.S. 570, 579–81 (2008); id. at 644–46 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 89.   See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
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process cases, the Court interprets the meaning of the Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments partly in light of equality values more 
naturally associated with the Equal Protection Clause.90 In cases considering the 
constitutionality of state protectionism on the subject of alcohol, the Court 
interprets the Twenty-First Amendment in light of the dormant Commerce 
Clause.91 One could go on. 
Notably, the Court’s doctrine today protects political rights such as jury 
service under equal protection, not under the Nineteenth Amendment.92  In effect, 
the Court is interpreting the Equal Protection Clause in light of the Nineteenth 
Amendment.93 Beyond political equality, synthesizing interpretation of the 
Nineteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause provides a firmer 
constitutional foundation for modern constitutional sex discrimination doctrine 
more generally.94 It would not have made great sense in historical context to give 
African American men the political rights of voting, running for office, and serving 
on juries but not the civil rights of owning property, contracting, suing, and testifying 
in court.95 That is because political equality for African Americans was far more 
 
 90.   See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992). 
 91.  See, e.g., Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019) (holding that 
Tennessee’s two-year durational-residency requirement, which applies to applicants for retail liquor 
store licenses, violates the dormant Commerce Clause and is not saved by Section 2 of the Twenty-first 
Amendment, which provides that “[t]he transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or 
Possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the 
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited”). 
 92.  See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding that the use of peremptory 
challenges to exclude jurors based solely on their sex violates the Equal Protection Clause); Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that racial discrimination in jury selection violates the Equal Protection 
Clause); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (holding that the Sixth Amendment prohibits women from 
being excluded or given automatic exemptions from jury service based solely on their sex if the result 
is that criminal jury venires are almost entirely male, and rejecting the contrary implications of Hoyt v. 
Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), which held that the Equal Protection Clause permits the exclusion of women 
from jury service unless they volunteer). 
 93.  For an argument that the Nineteenth Amendment should be interpreted in light of other 
amendments expanding voting rights (listed supra note 49), see Richard L. Hasen & Leah M. Litman, Thin 
and Thick Conceptions of the Nineteenth Amendment Right to Vote and Congress’s Power to Enforce It, GEO. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 20–22) (on file with author). 
 94.  Professor Reva Siegel offers one synthetic account. She identifies the foundation in 
constitutional history of the Court’s equal protection, sex discrimination jurisprudence by canvassing 
the debates over woman suffrage that began with the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
culminated with the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. See generally Siegel, Democratization of 
the Family, supra note 70; Siegel, She the People, supra note 41. Professor Akhil Amar offers another 
synthetic account. He argues that the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole, including 
amendments, so that a new amendment can require reinterpretation of other provisions of the 
Constitution. In his view, the Nineteenth Amendment, reflecting a super-majoritarian recognition of 
gender equality, requires a reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
to make gender discrimination in other contexts unconstitutional. See AMAR, supra note 3, at 426–28; 
Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465 (1995). 
 95.  The lawmakers who debated constitutional equality in connection with the Reconstruction 
Amendments generally accepted mid-century conceptions distinguishing equality with respect to civil 
rights, social rights, and political rights. Although the precise contours of those categories were unclear, they 
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controversial at the time than was civil equality. Likewise, it does not make much 
historical sense to read the Constitution as protecting women’s political equality 
but not their civil equality—and, indeed, the Court has not done that. Although 
the voting rights protected by the Fifteenth Amendment did not conceptually 
imply the civil rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, it is also true that 
it was untenable to extend the franchise to a group that lacked civil equality. 
The most plausible implication for gender equality is that the political 
equality secured by the Nineteenth Amendment also implies the civil equality 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The two provisions are tied together 
historically and by subject matter. The Nineteenth Amendment was the 
culmination of the suffragists’ response—decades in the making—to the rejection 
by the Reconstruction Congress of their demand for the vote. Moreover, both 
provisions require interpreters to confront the meaning of equal citizenship. 
Reading the Nineteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause 
synthetically reflects the historical and normative case for the proposition that the 
Constitution’s equality guarantee protects women, too. One need not rely on the 
race-sex analogy in order to get there, although the analogy provides added 
support, as do certain originalist accounts.96 
D. United States v. Virginia 
Justice Ginsburg gestured in the direction of a synthetic reading of the 
Nineteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause in her opinion for the 
Court in United States v. Virginia.97 In that 1996 decision, the Court held that the 
Equal Protection Clause barred the Commonwealth of Virginia from categorically 
excluding women from eligibility to enroll at the Virginia Military Institute, 
 
provided a general framework for thinking about the meaning of constitutional equality. Those distinctions 
informed the congressional debate over, among other things, the Fourteenth Amendment. They also defined 
the debate between the majority and the dissent in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (invalidating 
a state law providing that only whites could serve on juries), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) 
(upholding racial segregation in railroad cars as long as the separate accommodations were “equal”).  
Although the boundaries among the categories were contested, the basic purpose of those distinctions was 
to expand and to limit constitutional guarantees of equality for African Americans. Those distinctions ensured 
that the Civil War Amendments would go only so far, but no farther. For a discussion, see generally Mark 
Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in Constitutional Law, 74 J. AM. HIST. 884 (1987); see also BALKIN, supra note 71, 
at 221–26 (2011); FARBER & SIEGEL, supra note 61, at 238, 288; RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN 
LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 154–56 (Quentin Skinner et al. eds., 1999). 
 96.  See Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1 
(2011). Resorting to higher levels of generality is one way to square originalism with modern-day 
decisions that have established principles with deep normative appeal. For instance, Professor 
Calabresi and Ms. Rickert argue that modern decisions requiring heightened scrutiny in gender 
discrimination cases are consistent with original meaning. The core of their argument is that Fourteenth 
Amendment reaches “all special or partial laws that single out certain persons or classes for special 
benefits or burdens.” Id. at 7. In a departure from standard originalist methodology, they also rely on 
the later-enacted Nineteenth Amendment to support their interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In their view, the modern “change in our understanding of women’s abilities has been 
constitutionalized by a monumental Article V amendment—the Nineteenth Amendment, which in 
1920 gave women the right to vote.” Id. at 9. In that respect, they follow Professor Siegel and Professor 
Amar. See supra note 94. 
 97.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
Prof. Siegel- FINAL PAGE PROOF 0306 (Do Not Delete) 3/6/2020  9:15 AM 
 WHY THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT MATTERS TODAY 259 
reasoning that Virginia’s admissions policy reflected and reinforced both 
traditional stereotypes about women’s nature and their exclusion from 
educational, economic, and political life. In the pivotal Part IV of the Court’s 
opinion, Ginsburg invoked the Nineteenth Amendment in explaining why the 
Court’s modern equal protection doctrine subjects sex-based state action to 
demanding judicial review: 
Today’s skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or 
opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history. As a plurality 
of this Court acknowledged a generation ago, “our Nation has had a long 
and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.” Through a century plus 
three decades and more of that history, women did not count among 
voters composing “We the People”; not until 1920 did women gain a 
constitutional right to the franchise.98 
In that stunningly suggestive but also under-developed passage, Ginsburg linked 
the Court’s current interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to the separate-
spheres tradition that the Nineteenth Amendment repudiated. In contrast to 
Justice Scalia’s valorization of deeply rooted history and tradition in his solo 
dissent,99 Ginsburg’s majority opinion invoked the history antecedent and 
subsequent to the Nineteenth Amendment as anti-tradition and “negative 
precedent,” which is a repudiated precedent that is invoked as a mistake that the 
Court should not repeat.100 That history matters, she implied, because it captures 
what the United States rejected—in principle, if not always in practice—when it 
wrote into its fundamental law the determination that women are not children—
that women possess sufficient independence from men to be trusted to vote 
responsibly. 
Ginsburg went on in Part IV to interpret the meaning of the heightened 
scrutiny that the Court applies to sex classifications. There has been much debate 
among the Justices and commentators over whether the Court was really applying 
intermediate scrutiny or was actually applying strict scrutiny.101 But far more 
significant than that issue is the fact that Ginsburg interpreted heightened scrutiny 
for sex-based state action as anti-subordination: 
 
 
 98.  Id. at 531 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (footnote omitted)). 
 99.  See id. at 568–69 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is my view that ‘when a practice not expressly 
prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, 
widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no proper 
basis for striking it down.’ The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to a practice asserted to be in violation 
of the post-Civil War Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citations omitted). 
 100.  For discussions, see generally Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011); 
Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 245 (1998); Deborah A. 
Widiss, Note, Re-Viewing History: The Use of the Past as Negative Precedent in United States v. Virginia, 108 YALE 
L.J. 237 (1998). 
 101.  See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Only the amorphous ‘exceedingly 
persuasive justification’ phrase [used by the Court], and not the standard elaboration of intermediate 
scrutiny, can be made to yield this conclusion that VMI’s single-sex composition is unconstitutional 
because there exist several women (or, one would have to conclude under the Court’s reasoning, a 
single woman) willing and able to undertake VMI’s program.”). 
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Sex classifications may be used to compensate women “for particular 
economic disabilities [they have] suffered,” to “promot[e] equal 
employment opportunity,” to advance full development of the talent and 
capacities of our Nation’s people. But such classifications may not be used, as 
they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority 
of women.102 
The connection between the Nineteenth Amendment and the Court’s anti-
subordination understanding of equal protection for women in Virginia is again 
not sharply drawn. But it becomes legible once one recalls that suffrage restrictions 
were status-based regulations, and that the Nineteenth Amendment rejected 
them.103 
More concretely and practically, judges are not offered much interpretive 
guidance when they are told to decide whether any and all sex classifications are 
“substantially related to an important governmental interest,” which is the Court’s 
constitutional test for sex discrimination (known as intermediate scrutiny).104 By 
contrast, reading the Equal Protection Clause in light of the Nineteenth 
Amendment helps judges and other interpreters to discern which sex 
classifications are problematic and which are not. Part of Justice Ginsburg’s point 
in Virginia is that not all sex lines are equally suspect; the constitutionally troubling 
classifications reflect or reinforce women’s subordination in the family or, 
relatedly, their exclusion from public life. Instructing judges and other interpreters 
to ask whether a given sex classification is being used “to create or perpetuate the 
legal, social, and economic inferiority of women” provides a great deal more 
interpretive guidance. And that anti-subordination analytic is coming 
substantially from the pre- and post-ratification history of the Nineteenth 
Amendment. 
IV. CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 
A. The Nineteenth Amendment and the Equal Rights Amendment 
The proposed Equal Rights Amendment provides that “[e]quality of rights 
under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of sex.”105 When initially introduced, the ERA was supported by well more 
than the required two-third majorities in both houses of Congress,106 a significant 
majority of Americans,107 and a solid majority of states. But it fell three states short of 
 
 102.  See id. at 533–34 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted). 
 103.  For a similar interpretation of the Court’s opinion in Virginia, see Siegel, Democratization of the Family, 
supra note 70, at 483–86. 
 104.  The Court first adopted intermediate scrutiny for sex classifications in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 
(1976). 
 105.  See EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT, https://www.equalrightsamendment.org (last visited Feb. 2, 
2020). 
 106.  See U.S. CONST. art. V; Andrew Glass, Equal Rights Amendment Clears Congress, Mar. 22, 1972, 
POLITICO (Mar. 22, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/equal-rights-amendment-clear 
s-congress-march-22-1972-220981 (“The House had voted 354–24 in favor of the amendment. The Senate 
— after rejecting an exemption of women from the draft—voted for it 84–8.”). 
 107.  See Louis Bolce, Gerald De Maio, & Douglas Muzzio, The Equal Rights Amendment, Public 
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the thirty-eight required for ratification, in part because it became entangled in the 
debate over abortion.108 Nevada ratified in 2017, Illinois ratified in 2018, and Virginia 
ratified in 2020, although it is not clear whether those recent ratifications count or 
whether the time for ratification expired years earlier.109 
Would the Nineteenth Amendment, properly understood, render practically 
superfluous the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)? Put differently, 
would the Nineteenth Amendment—whether standing on its own or illuminating 
the implications of the Equal Protection Clause for gender equality—limit the ERA 
to expressively reaffirming what the Constitution already protects? Those are 
difficult questions, so much so that this Essay cannot responsibly take them on—
other than to suggest that a full embrace by the interpretive community of 
structural and synthetic readings of the Nineteenth Amendment and the Equal 
Protection Clause would likely go far toward rendering the ERA less necessary as 
a source of substantive constitutional rights. 
Instead, the Essay will identify another way in which the story of the 
Nineteenth Amendment potentially bears on contemporary debates over the ERA.  
There were significant differences in the interpretive arguments of opponents of 
the Nineteenth Amendment before and after its ratification. As discussed in Part 
II, during decades of contestation prior to ratification, gender traditionalists 
portrayed an affirmative answer to the “woman question” as radically 
transforming—and degrading—both the American family and American 
federalism. Traditionalists asserted confidently that woman suffrage would sow 
marital discord because husbands and wives would sometimes disagree on 
political matters. (To reiterate, the tension between that argument against woman 
suffrage and the argument from virtual representation typically went unnoticed 
by those who made the arguments.) As for federalism, recall the claim of 
conservatives that constitutionalizing the “woman question” would 
inappropriately take the matter away from the states. The states, they insisted, had 
long been deciding on their own whether and when to allow women to vote, in 
conformity with a deeply rooted history and tradition of federal deference to state 
domestic relations law.110 
By striking contrast, not long after ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, 
gender traditionalists recast the debate that was resolved by the Amendment as 
involving merely a decision rule about voting in elections—as concerning only 
whether women could vote for candidates for political office as well as in 
initiatives and referenda.111 Beyond the scope of the Amendment, they insisted, 
 
Opinion, & American Constitutionalism, 19 POLITY 551 (1987). 
 108.  See, e.g., Twiss Butler, Abortion Law: “Unique Problem for Women” or Sex Discrimination?, 4 YALE J.L. 
& FEMINISM 133, 133–34 (1991). 
 109.  See Two Modes to Ratification, EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT, supra note 105. 
 110.  See supra note 53 and accompanying text (citing one prominent commentator who opposed 
woman suffrage on federalism grounds). 
 111.  Professor Reva Siegel has documented the Nineteenth Amendment’s short journey from norm to 
rule: 
Within years of its adoption, one can see the Nineteenth Amendment progressively 
dissociated from questions concerning the family that governed the debate over woman 
suffrage from the antebellum period to ratification. And as courts proceeded to dissociate 
the Nineteenth Amendment from the concerns that dominated the debates over its 
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were the questions of whether women were constitutionally entitled to be 
candidates for political office and to serve on juries.112 And of course, they further 
insisted, the Nineteenth Amendment had nothing to say about whether the civil 
rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause extended to women. 
Part III identified some vulnerabilities of such traditionalist arguments. More 
relevant here is a lesson for recent debates over the ERA. Whatever one thinks of 
the arguments for and against ratification of the ERA, one can be confident that 
those arguments will change if the ERA is ultimately approved. Opponents will 
likely move from warning that the constitutional sky will fall if the ERA becomes 
fundamental law to engaging in damage control, reading the amendment 
narrowly. Likewise, proponents will likely move from reading the ERA more 
narrowly in order to secure ratification to reading it more expansively in order to 
secure a greater degree of gender equality as they understand such equality. There 
is nothing rare about that dynamic; it is, for example, characteristic of much 
constitutional litigation: litigants often try to persuade judges that a ruling in their 
favor would be narrow (or that a ruling against them would be broad), only to 
interpret the ruling broadly once they obtain it (or narrowly once they lose). But 
Americans who are moved to mark the centennial of the Nineteenth Amendment 
are well-advised to bear the dynamic in mind if they mean to prevent ratification 
of the ERA at some future time from signifying little. In that regard, the story to 
date of the Nineteenth Amendment should not become the story of the ERA. 
B. The Halting Pace of Progress 
The story of the Nineteenth Amendment is at least as sobering as it is 
inspiring—probably more so. As noted, women who sought to secure voting 
rights for women served in abolitionist organizations before the Civil War only to 
have their calls for female enfranchisement rejected first by the Reconstruction 
Congress and then by the post-Reconstruction Supreme Court. Suffragist women 
and their male allies then fought for half a century—from the ratification of the 
Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 until the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment 
 
ratification, they domesticated the woman suffrage amendment, erasing the deep structural 
and symbolic significance that for generations had been imputed to this constitutional 
reform. With interpretive construction of the Nineteenth Amendment as a rule dissociated 
from any larger normative concerns, one can see the containment of the Amendment’s 
potential significance—its transformation from a systemically explosive reform to a 
systemically unremarkable, normatively insignificant, fragment of constitutional text. 
Siegel, She the People, supra note 41, at 1012. Siegel goes on to observe that “[t]his process of domestication 
was not inevitable, as early cases such as Adkins v. Children’s Hospital illustrate.” Id. (citing Adkins v. 
Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). In Adkins, the Court understood the Nineteenth Amendment 
as articulating a sex equality norm that had implications for constitutional questions other than voting.  
In holding that a minimum wage law for women violated economic substantive due process, the Adkins 
Court articulated a sex-equality rationale and expressly invoked the Nineteenth Amendment. See id. at 
553. For a new history of how a thin conception of the Nineteenth Amendment emerged by the end of 
the decade after its ratification, see generally PAULA A. MONOPOLI, CONSTITUTIONAL ORPHAN: GENDER 
EQUALITY AND THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT (forthcoming 2020). 
 112.  See Siegel, She the People, supra note 41, at 1019–22 (discussing decisions applying the 
Nineteenth Amendment to office holding and jury service, and concluding that a “narrow 
understanding of the Nineteenth Amendment, as a rule governing voting only, emerged as the 
dominant understanding of the Amendment”). 
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in 1920—for a suffrage amendment that was decried by traditionalist critics as 
destructive of both the American family and the American federal system. Then, 
when the Amendment was finally able to run the Article V gauntlet, it did not take 
long for jurists to recast the entire debate over the “woman question” as always 
having involved only the mere question of voting rights for women in elections, 
with no implications for women’s political equality or civil rights more generally. 
With the constitutional history of the struggle over woman suffrage 
effectively excised from collective memory, the Supreme Court spent the next half-
century upholding sexist laws and regulations as reflecting natural and admirable 
differences in the capacities and social roles of women and men. For example, in 
1948, in Goesaert v. Cleary,113 the Court upheld as rational a Michigan law prohibiting 
women from being bartenders except in bars owned by their fathers or husbands.  
And in 1961, in Hoyt v. Florida,114 the Court upheld a Florida law allowing women (but 
not men) to opt out of jury service.  The Court doubled down on the separate spheres 
ideology in such decisions without mentioning the Nineteenth Amendment or 
considering what it means and implies constitutionally for women to be declared 
the political equals of men. It was not until 1971 that the Court held, for the first 
time in American history, that the Equal Protection Clause protects women, too.115  
Over the subsequent decades and to this day, the Court has not always been 
guided by Justice Ginsburg’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause for the 
Court in Virginia, which (to reiterate) held that government may not use sex 
classifications that reflect or reinforce women’s inferior social status in the family 
and in American society.116 Relatedly, the Court has not always been guided by 
the principle that Congress possesses ample authority to vindicate that 
substantive, anti-subordination vision of equal protection, including to combat 
violence against women.117 
 
 113.  Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
 114.  Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).  Hoyt was not overruled until 1975, in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 
U.S. 522 (1975). 
 115.  See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
 116.  See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a sex 
classification in federal immigration law that requires unwed U.S.-citizen fathers, but not unwed U.S.-
citizen mothers, to prove parentage in order to convey citizenship to children born outside the United 
States). But see Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (holding that equal protection 
principles prohibit a sex classification in federal immigration law that creates an exception for unwed 
U.S.-citizen mothers, but not for such fathers, to the physical-presence requirement for the transmission 
of U.S. citizenship to a child born abroad, but that only Congress may convert the exception into the 
main rule displacing other relevant provisions of the law). 
 117.  See, e.g., Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012) (ignoring the links between 
pregnancy and sex-stereotyping in denying that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment authorized 
the self-care provisions of the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA)); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that Congress lacks power under either the Commerce Clause or 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide victims of gender-motivated violence with a federal 
civil damages remedy against their assailants). The Court’s Section Five holding in Morrison is especially 
worthy of reconsideration in light of the Me Too Movement. See ME TOO., https://metoomvmt.org. For 
discussions of the implications of the Nineteenth Amendment for the lawfulness of Morrison, see Siegel, She 
the People, supra note 41, at 1022–44; Siegel, Democratization of the Family, supra note 70, at 488. If the history of 
the suffrage movement were better known to lawyers, judges, and constitutional law scholars, it would not 
seem like a ridiculous question to ask whether the private civil damages remedy for victims of gender-
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If moral and democratic progress means that women possess the same 
political and civil rights as men—that women possess full and equal citizenship 
stature118—then the story of the Nineteenth Amendment (the before, the during, 
and the after) is a sobering reminder that such progress is slow, uneven, and 
halting, not linear. Deeply rooted traditions, including the separate spheres 
tradition, are preserved even as they are transformed.119 Other parts of the history, 
such as heated debates over woman suffrage from the ratification of the Fifteenth 
Amendment to the ratification of the Nineteenth, are conveniently forgotten.  
Contemporary forms of gender subordination either are not perceived, or are 
ignored, or are rationalized away. Much work remains to be done. Traditionalists 
will rhetorically ask, for example, what the clear, determinate voting rule set forth 
in the Nineteenth Amendment could possibly have to do with current debates 
over unequal pay for equal work, paid family and self-care leave, and restrictions 
on access to effective, affordable contraception and abortion. This Essay’s final 
section turns to those questions. 
C. Gender (In)equality Today 
The primary reason the Nineteenth Amendment matters today is that the 
struggle for gender equality is far from over. Girls (and boys) continue to be 
socialized in a popular culture that is pervaded by highly sexualized images of 
unrealistically thin and beautified women whose primary work in the world 
appears to be staying that way. Those same girls (and boys) watch as female 
candidates for political office are subjected to double standards and hatred that 
male candidates do not endure. During the run-up to the 2016 presidential election, 
for example, the author had to explain to his then-eleven-year-old daughter the 
meaning of a bumper sticker reading “Trump that Bitch,” which adorned the rear of 
a pick-up truck being driven by a man. Those who deny that sexism and misogyny 
infect American politics might think harder about the social meaning of that bumper 
sticker.120 
 
motivated violence invalidated in Morrison was valid enforcement legislation under Section Two of the 
Nineteenth Amendment, either alone or in combination with Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
For a normative and then predictive exploration of the potential scope of Congress’s enforcement power 
under Section Two of the Nineteenth Amendment, see Hasen & Litman, supra note 93, at 24–49. 
 118.  See generally Siegel, “Equal Citizenship Stature,” supra note 37 (arguing that the quest for equal 
citizenship stature is the defining feature of Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional vision). 
 119.  For the seminal discussion of how efforts to reform a status regime produce changes in its rule 
structure and justificatory rhetoric, see Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and 
Privacy,105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2178–87 (1996); see also generally Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer 
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997). 
 120.  That bumper sticker might also have been sending the message to girls and women that politics is 
not for them. Males and females in the United States are socialized differently on the question of whether 
they should even be thinking about going into politics. For studies finding (among other things) that 
girls and women are socialized not to pursue political careers, see generally JENNIFER L. LAWLESS & 
RICHARD L. FOX, WOMEN & POLITICS INST., GIRLS JUST WANNA NOT RUN: THE GENDER GAP IN YOUNG 
AMERICANS’ POLITICAL AMBITION, (2013), https://www.american.edu/spa/wpi/upload/girls-just-
wanna-not-run_policy-report.pdf; Laurel Elder, Why Women Don’t Run: Explaining Women’s 
Underrepresentation in America’s Political Institutions, 26 WOMEN & POLITICS 27 (2004). 
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Life hardly becomes less gendered as those girls (and boys) mature.  
Although the gender wage gap has declined in recent decades, women continue 
to earn unequal pay for equal work.121 Mothers continue to bear a disproportionate 
share of family-care responsibilities in an economy that continues to be organized 
primarily on the assumptions that employees do not have substantial family-care 
responsibilities and that good employees can prioritize work over any competing 
obligations because they have a supportive spouse or partner.122 The gendered 
organization of the family and the workplace—and the need of most women (and, 
increasingly, men) to negotiate both spheres in order to take care of themselves 
and their families—make it all the more essential that women and men be given 
paid parental leave and be able to control whether and when to become parents.123  
Yet paid parental leave is unavailable for most women and men who work,124 and 
women face not just continuing, but increasing legal restrictions on access to 
effective, affordable contraception and abortion.125 
To be sure, abortion is a controversial topic, including among women, 
because abortion restrictions are shaped not just by gender bias but also by 
concerns about fetal life.126  Likewise, abortion-restrictive regulations cause not just 
gendered impacts but also impacts on the unborn.127 But as noted above, most 
women and men in the United States oppose draconian restrictions on access to 
 
 121.  See generally Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and 
Explanations, 55 J. ECON. LIT. 789 (2017). 
 122.  See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 2 (2000) (“[T]he ideal worker [is] someone who works at least forty hours a week year round. 
This ideal-worker norm, framed around the traditional life patterns of men, excludes most mothers of 
childbearing age.”); see also Siegel & Siegel, supra note 15, at 1037 (“Over the centuries in which law and 
custom dictated that women were to serve as caregivers and men as breadwinners, assumptions about 
the ‘ideal worker’ shaped the development of educational and employment institutions.”). 
 123.  See id. (“Given these widespread and deeply entrenched norms and arrangements, control 
over the timing of childbearing and childrearing is now crucial to women’s full and equal participation 
in the educational and economic spheres. Contraception both enables and symbolizes women’s interest 
in coordinating work and family.”). 
 124.  See Jill Cowan, Paid Parental Leave, by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2019/01/11/us/california-today-paid-parental-leave.html (reporting, inter alia, that only six 
states and Washington, DC, offer paid parental leave; that the longest state family leave program—
Washington State’s—is twelve weeks; that only 16 percent of Americans receive paid parental leave from 
their employers; and, in contrast, that 80 percent of Americans support paid parental leave and that the 
average total paid leave available to mothers among O.E.C.D. countries in 2016 was fifty-five weeks). 
 125.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Dias, Sabrina Tavernise, & Alan Blinder, “This Is a Wave”: Inside the Network of 
Anti-Abortion Activists Winning Across the Country, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/05/18/us/anti-abortion-laws.html?module=inline (“State after state is passing sweeping abortion 
restrictions this year, from Alabama’s near total abortion ban, to Ohio’s ban after a fetal heartbeat is 
detected, to Utah’s ban after a pregnancy reaches 18 weeks.”). On contraceptive access, see the next 
paragraph in the text. 
 126.  See Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Equality Arguments for Abortion Rights, 60 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 160, 163 (2013) (observing that “equality arguments do not suppose that restrictions on abortion 
are only about women” but instead “are premised on the view that restrictions on abortion may be about both 
women and the unborn—both and,” and that “equality analysis entertains the possibility that gender 
stereotypes may shape how the state pursues otherwise benign ends”). 
 127.  See id. (discussing the gendered impacts of abortion restrictions). 
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abortion.128 Moreover, contraception is not especially controversial among women 
in the United States: a solid majority of women use contraception or seek to use it, 
including a supermajority of Catholic women who are at risk of unintended 
pregnancy.129 Even so, employers with religious or moral objections to what they 
deem to be “complicity” in their female employees’ use of contraception are 
gaining increasing authority, conferred by controversial judicial interpretations of 
federal or state law, to make it harder for female wage earners to access effective, 
affordable contraception and thereby not have to resort to abortion.130 As for the 
response (one used to hear more frequently but still hears today) that abstinence 
is always a permissible option, Americans might be curious about why politicians, 
judges, and cultural norms in the United States have so seldom instructed men to 
abstain from sex; why governments have long permitted condoms, but not the 
most effective forms of female contraception, to be made widely and cheaply 
available;131 and why health insurance plans covered Viagra, but not 
contraceptives, with near-lightning speed.132 
The Nineteenth Amendment, whether read structurally in light of its history 
or synthetically with the Equal Protection Clause, does not determine a uniquely 
correct answer to all of the above questions, whether that answer is found in 
constitutional politics or in constitutional law. But the Nineteenth Amendment, 
including its history, bears on the proper resolution of those questions. That is 
because the Amendment—if only it would be noticed—calls upon Americans to ask 
themselves what it means to take women seriously as the equals of men, in both 
family life and public life. It is past time for American citizens, legislators, lawyers, 
judges, and scholarly keepers of the constitutional canon to take full account of the 





 128.  See supra note 16. 
 129.  See Contraceptive Use in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (July 2018), https://www.guttmacher. 
org/fact-sheet/contraceptive-use-united-states (reporting, inter alia, that “more than 99% of women aged 
15–44 who have ever had sexual intercourse have used at least one contraceptive method”; that “[s]ome 
60% of all women of reproductive age are currently using a contraceptive method”; and that “eighty-
nine percent of at-risk Catholics and 90% of at-risk Protestants currently use a method”). 
 130.  See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that the regulations 
promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services requiring employers to provide their 
female employees with no-cost access to contraception violate the federal Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) as applied to closely held corporations). 
 131.  See Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Contraception as a Sex Equality Right, 124 YALE L.J.F. 349, 
353–54 (2015) (observing that, during the 1940s, the Connecticut Supreme Court “advised women with 
a medical need for contraception that they should simply abstain from sex, but did not advise men to 
protect themselves from the risk of venereal disease in this fashion” and instead “allowed men to buy 
condoms on demand in the state’s drug stores, while making no effort to ensure that men (particularly 
married men) actually were using condoms to prevent disease, as opposed to conception”). 
 132.  For a discussion, see generally Bailey Sanders, Partisan Bridges to Bipartisanship: The Case of 
Contraceptive Coverage, 43 LEG. STUD. Q. 521 (2018).  
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CONCLUSION 
It turns out that there are many reasons why the Nineteenth Amendment is 
relevant to the lives of contemporary Americans. Surely there are additional 
reasons not discussed in this Essay. Another that comes to mind—as Americans 
increasingly reckon with their shared past in conflicts over how to remember the 
legacies of historic figures like Woodrow Wilson and historic social movements 
like woman suffrage—is that history is often a complicated, mixed bag; that most 
people and social movements are morally neither all good nor all bad; and that 
sometimes people can change, at least to some extent and on some issues.133 
Not just Woodrow Wilson, but prominent suffragists as well are morally 
complex figures from the vantage point of the centennial of the Nineteenth 
Amendment. Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony had worked for 
decades in the abolitionist movement, had advocated for emancipation, had 
petitioned for ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, and had pushed for 
universal suffrage in the early years of the suffrage movement. But they were 
living in a society whose long persisting practices of racial and gender hierarchy 
severely constrained social and legal change in ways that made realizing their 
universalist goals very difficult and required compromises that fractured the 
suffrage movement. Although some white suffragists, including Lucy Stone, 
refused to play the race card and advocated for ratification of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, others, including Stanton and Anthony, let their class privilege, 
anger, and yes, racism, get the better of them. Tragically, they made arguments to 
the effect that it did not make sense to give black men the right to vote but not 
white women when white women were superior.134 Moreover, during the decades 
after the Civil War, they and some other suffragists would at times make racist, 
xenophobic, and elitist appeals that were ineffective and ultimately self-defeating: 
the basic claim was that the votes of white women would outnumber the votes of 
blacks, foreigners, and ignorant workers.135 Although the dark parts of the suffrage 
 
 133.  See supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text (noting the complex, evolving relationship of 
President Woodrow Wilson to the suffrage movement, although not to the racial situation in the nation). 
 134.  For example, Stanton wrote that “[w]e are moral, virtuous, and intelligent, and in all respects 
quite equal to the proud white man himself and yet by your laws we are classed with idiots, lunatics, 
and negroes.” Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address to the Legislature of the State of New York (Feb. 14, 
1854), reproduced in KATHERINE T. BARTLETT ET AL., GENDER AND THE LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, 
COMMENTARY 17 (7th ed. 2017).  See KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 178 (“[M]any feminists denigrated the abilities 
and qualifications of African Americans. Stanton herself objected to having ‘the colored man enfranchised 
before the women . . . I would not trust him with all my rights; degraded, oppressed himself, he would be 
more despotic with the governing power than even our Saxon rulers are.’”); id. (“[S]ome advocates of female 
suffrage, including Anthony, allied themselves with overtly racist Democrats who opposed black 
enfranchisement.”). 
 135.  For a discussion, see KEYSSAR, supra note 7, at 190, 191, 194–95, 198–204, 210. As Professor Keyssar 
explains, it is no simple task to make sense of the appeals to white supremacy that were made by some 
suffragists: 
To be sure, the relationship between women’s suffrage and black enfranchisement in the 
South was byzantine.  Many white suffragists declined to play the race card, and even some 
who did were motivated less by a commitment to white supremacy than by the search for a 
potent line of attack.  In addition, the ranks of southern suffragists included a growing 
number of African-American women. The most strident antagonists of black rights, 
moreover, belonged to the anti-women’s suffrage camp: one of the principal arguments 
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movement should not be whitewashed today, it also does not seem appropriate to 
focus on the racism, xenophobia, and elitism of some white suffragists to the 
exclusion of all the good things that they fought for—especially given the America 
in which they were socialized and that they were struggling to change in the face 
of relentless backlash. And to repeat a point from earlier in the Essay, the most 
virulent racists were steadfastly opposed to woman suffrage. 
The primary purpose of this Essay has been to suggest that the full story of 
the Nineteenth Amendment has always involved much more than a narrow 
debate over a determinate decision rule regarding women’s access to the 
franchise—as vitally important as that specific constitutional right is. Americans 
might bear in mind all of the reasons why the Nineteenth Amendment matters 
today as they mark the centennial of the Amendment. And as difficult as it may 
be for many Americans to do, they might honor the occasion without indulging in 
self-congratulatory celebration of all the moral and democratic progress that 
Americans have made on “the woman question.”136 They might instead 
supplement their solemn pride in a measure of progress that has been genuinely 
substantial with profound gratitude for the women and men who have been 
responsible for it—and with circumspection and introspection about why the 
journey to equal citizenship stature for women in the United States has been so 




against female enfranchisement from 1890 to 1920 was that it would open an additional door 
to black voting and possibly to federal intervention in election laws. Nonetheless, the 
currency of the statistical argument, particularly coupled with NAWSA’s own tolerance of 
segregation, highlighted the distance that the movement had traveled from the equal rights 
impulses of the 1860s. 
Id. at 199. NAWSA was the National American Woman Suffrage Association, which in 1890 unified 
two competing suffrage organizations.  Stanton and Anthony were the first two presidents of the 
association. Id. at 197. Notably, “[i]n the South, the statistical argument was simply no match for the 
frenzied political circus that was disenfranchising blacks and poor whites in one state after another.”  
Id. at 202. Moreover, “the anti-black, anti-immigrant, and anti-working class argument in favor of 
women’s suffrage was inescapably weakionened by its own internal contradictions.” Id. 
 136.  Lacking a sense of shame about the past may be an unfortunate part of the American ethos. For a 
stark contrast, consider, for example, the basic attitude (albeit with anti-Semitic exceptions) of contemporary 
German society toward Nazism and the Holocaust. 
 137.  For a subdued, critical perspective on the bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution that strikes a tone 
worthy of emulation, see generally Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States 
Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
